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I * Abegging
study of
practice questions.
would be wise
thebalancing
most interesting
But to
it avoid
is difficult to confront a practice in the purity of a phenomenology that finds meaning below surface qualities without
being guilty of illegitimate importations from sources extemal to it. To some, for example, balancing is an exercise in reason, a mode of rationality, a type of logic, a procedure of thought that might loosely qualify as a
methodology. Balancing-as-reason is necessarily located
within a tradition that has definite contours, a particular
history, and polices its boundaries with rules operating as
a system of exclusion/inclusion. In order to minimize the
distortion of limitation, the seminar situated balancing
against a background of Truth, as a moment in the movement of Truth chosen strategically to insure preservation
of a discursive multiplicity. In order to leave open, that is,
the ability to speak of balancing as faith, reason, intuition,
ideology and power.
There is another, perhaps more honest, reason. The
seminar devoted to studying balancing took so many turns
over the five years - each semester and frequently within
single sessions as well - that postulating balancing as a
moment in the movement of Truth seems the most
plausable way to account for the unity of these conversations. I expect that some will regard this as a cheap trick
since any disparity can be unified under a sufficiently grand
concept, and what could be more grandly pretentious than
Truth. The remainder of this paper may be read as an argument that it is not a trick to think of our conversations in
relation to Truth, and it is certainly not cheap. A
photographic essay may not be falsified on the ground that
INTHE PUBUc INTEREST

it is not a movie. From our first sessions straining against
Horwitz's thesis in "The Transformation of American Law"
to the last ones wallowing in the gloom of Levi's "Barbarism
With a Human Face", our meetings have tried to get a sense
of different experiences of the world. With the benefit of
hindsight it is no surprise that we should be brought, time
and again, to the question of difference itself, to the question of historical continuities and ruptures, to the extent
we can grant conceptual language a consistency that spans
centuries and therefore makes possible a history of balancing - or any other practice. No sensible university course
would begin in this 'haphazard' fashion; without a formulated concept, a definition of the key term, or at least
a description of the practice. But we avoided initial precision to prevent a closure that would surely be boring and
unsatisfying in order to open up possibilities and agitate
a sense of wonderment. Whatever else may be said of these
conversations, from time to time they succeeded in producing bewildered amazement and severe depression within an academic program!
We did not begin, of course, in some fantastic mode
of absolute freedom but with an understanding that balancing was a practice among lawyers that could be treated
as a way of knowing or justifying. The possibility of a disjunctive relationship is itself interesting since the practices
of science produce their knowledge through a method of
investigation and make statements that must be justified
by the same method; knowledge and justification cannot
readily be disjoined. In legal practice the possibility of
treating balancing as either a way of knowing or a way of
justifying is created by a more or less widely accepted
'political psychology' of disingenuousness and deception
holding that balancing as a discourse of justification may
have little to do with the actual motivation of decisions and
judgments. Similarly, philosophers in the modem tradition
might readily claim that knowing and justifying are quite
different practices, or perhaps require different sorts of
statements. Both the psychology and the philosophy,
however, may be situated in a precise relation with certain
disruptions in the organization of knowledge; a particular
epistemology conditions and grounds the proposition that
knowing and justifying are distinct practices. And to the
extent justifying refers to a logos it necessarily participates
in a history of what counts as a statement of Truth or a
true statement. It seems certain that balancing, the possibility of a disjunction between knowing and justifying, and
a philosophy rendering the disjunction coherent, were all
part of the same development in the history of Truth.
Thus the interrogation of balancing need not focus particularly on the disjunction of knowing and justifying or the
philosophy legitimizing it since, being all part of the same
movement, they are unlikely to do anything but mutually
entail each other or at least be distributed at different levels
of abstraction within the same discourse.
The distinction between knowing and justifying might
vanish in yet another way. Contemporary pragmatists
SPRJNG
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might elide or bracket balancing as a Truth while accepting it as a device or operational strategy. Balancing might
be preserved as an instrument through its Truth be criticized. This option was uncovered as seminar discussion
rapidly moved from discussion of "The Transformation of
American Law" to images taken from "Zen and the Art of
Motorcycle Maintenance" - and no one thought the movement ridiculous. The alternatives of a moral theology, an
instrumental political rationalism, or an intuition grounded in an innate sense of a thing that is open to the play
of appropriateness, yield a certain family resemblance when
the possibility of self-criticism is accepted. Levi-Strauss, for
example, asserts a severe distinction between bricolageand
engineering. The bricoleur is a kind of handy man or jack
of all trades who uses the means at his disposal, adapts
them to particular needs, regards their pre-existing 'nature7
in light of necessity and operational functions, submitting
them to trials and tentative appraisals. Engineering is founded on propositions, employs principles of general validity
and articulates concepts having no absolute dependence
on the context in which they are to be employed. Engineering is the latent theology of every bricoleur; the fantasy that
transforms every art into a science. But more to the point,
method retained as a mere device or operational strategy
in order to leave open the question of its Truth becomes
indistinguishable from bricolage:"as soon as we admit that
every finite discourse is bound by a certain bricolage and
that the engineer and the scientist are also species of
bricoleurs, then the very idea of bricolageis menaced and
the difference in which it took its meaning breaks down"
(Derrida, 285).
In addition to the basic premise that balancing is a
lawyer's practice, we had the singular experience of being
involved with questioning the obvious. The best evidence
the seminar had that balancing could not be understood
at the surface of its phenomenology as a practice was living in an environment that regarded our enterprise as
nothing less than peculiar and largely pointless. To many
people it was simply obvious that if one does not believe
in God, if there is no Truth, then all one can do is balance.
For the seminar, however, this claim could not possibly
serve as a point of termination; on the contrary, it was
exactly what made balancing worth study. If, to trace the
logic of the Supreme Court, balancing plays the same role
in contemporary life that God played in the life of our
ancestors then it appears as simply another system of
belief, of Truth, and is therefore caught in the stagnant contradiction of a Truth determined by the absence of Truth.
The seminar thus confronted problems generally perceived as mired in the swamp of a dismal metaphysics. Is
it merely ironic that people whom ordinary history describes
as alienated from nature and from modes of transcendence
do not seem conscious of it, while those who need to confront liberal alienation in some of the forms of its appearance feel intensely external to their own situation?
Save for those snared within the traps of a narrow and
is

cramped ideology there is no grand novelty in any of this.
People with pride in their sharply sophisticated social or
institutional realism plainly recognize that balancing is a
not particularly defensible political technology that is nevertheless reasonably well suited to ordinary liberal theory, injects a modest dose of reason into allocative decisions, and
provides some defense against the traditional dangers of
extraordinary accretions of power. The cause of liberal
freedom is best served by sharpening the practice, improving its tendency toward neutrality and rationality while
deterring the degeneracy of slipshod and mindless applications encasing the arbitrary and the corrupt in a fog of
rhetoric. The attitude is strikingly similar to the slightly
older defense of analogy as the essence of legal reasoning,
bearing a remarkable capacity for wisdom when properly
employed.
The mood of disintegration, by contrast, is less optimistic and confident that balancing is anything more than
a way of muddling through the inevitable consequences of
a pluralism that seeks to preserve itself and the mystique
of individual autonomy that constitutes it. The positive virtue of absolute interest diversity and the absence of a
coherent social purpose together create the space within
which private satisfactions may be realized - a space
bounded by balancing multiple desires. Since this balancing can never be grounded in an objective reason the mood
of disintegration is accompanied by a chronic depression
perhaps tempered by jocular indifference, resignation or
cynicism.
The tone of the legal literature that became conscious
of balancing in the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s
was invariably one of sophisticated realism in the sense
noted above. The tradition that closely aligns legal scholarship with practice no doubt helped structure the balancing
literature according to a discourse of identifications, levels,
and weights, within which criticism could serve to improve,
refine and ultimately contribute to the legitimacy of balancing as an 'approach'. Almost no attention was paid to alternatives since the received wisdom located balancing in postwar First Amendment law where it was set against a literal
absolutism. But even this alternative turned out to be more
than a little naive since the absolutism in question usually
referred to a legislative or constitutional text which was itself
the consequence of balancing. With freedom of speech
posed as an example of generic or definitional balancing the
way was cleared for the insertion of all issues respecting
the separation of powers within a balancing approach.
Balancing quickly became the concrete or operational
meaning of the new legal process according to which all
legal actors had to take account of everything - including
the limitations imposed by the actor's own specificity within
a functioning division of labor. The simple balancing approach yielded to a complexity of levels: balancing was not
only proper within a division of labor, it was also employed
to manage the division of labor itself.
Balancing could be defended as a discourse of reason
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precisely because of its operational complexity. First, there
was the matter of range of relevant considerations. The
approach was impoverished and distorted - and often
suspected of insincerity - by an inappropriately narrow
accounting of relevant considerations. The self interest of
the actor would generally provide some assurance against
error on the side of excess since a broader range of
relevance entailed far more work and increased the difficulty
of reconciliation or resolution. Apart from mistakes at the
level of particular inclusions and exclusions, the real danger
of ineptitude lay in the direction of deficiency. Second, relevant considerations should be distributed in recognition that
they may belong to different levels of experience along a
continuum from the particular/concrete to the universal/abstract. For example, national security may never be
introduced to justify the seizure of a particular letter addressed to an individual. Either the security consideration
must be unpacked to expose the specificity of the danger
posed by the letter, or national security must be balanced
against domestic insecurity. Disparity of levels marks a
failure of rationality or indicates the presence of a tendentious balancer. Finally, with all relevant considerations
distributed at commensurate levels of relative generality,
all that remains is the assignment of appropriate weights.
It would not be sensible simply to count the number of considerations since to do so puts excessive emphasis on the
discrete quality of elements that are bound to suffer some
overlap. More importantly, even an endless series of trivial
considerations ought not outweigh a single blockbuster. Extremes are useful to make the point, but if the task of identifying relevant considerations is properly managed and if
they have been assigned their proper levels of generality,
bright disparities of weight vanish in the dim perception
of very close and very hard cases.
It takes no great sleuth to discover the soft center
within this moderately elaborate analytic. Relevance is an
essential concept in legal work, yet very little is said about
it other than a notation of its relational character -- one
that is frequently not absolute but specifies a relativity. Considerations may be not very relevant or weakly/strongly so,
and arguments of relevance (as well as relevant arguments)
are the stuff of everyday practices. Balancing has nothing
special to say about relevance, so the matter is left open
for arguments and choices that depend upon some other
criteria or are situated in some allied discursive mode. To
the extent its rationality depends upon developing a menu
of relevant considerations balancing is at the mercy of an
alliance to which it adds nothing. The approach takes pains
to articulate commensurate levels of generality upon its
discovered range of considerations, but it must do so
without the guidance of a theory or principles. In spite of
its intense devotion to particularity, for example, balancing in adjudication is forced to generalize its cases in order
to avoid triviality or pretermitting results. Since what is at
stake is not merely the satisfaction of parties but a (re)statement of the law, some generalization beyond the contours
INTHE PUBuC INTEREST

of a singular event is inevitable. Furthermore, it seems widely assumed that deciding cases ad hoc is no less offensive
than deciding abstract issues. So the questions must be
posed as whether a certain level of expectation security
ought to be assured to one bargaining party against the
occurrence of contingencies that render performance a
hardship to the other party, or whether abortion should
be permitted where pregnancy threatens the life of the
mother, or whether the government can employ perjured
testimony in a case where other evidence overwhelmingly
implicates the defendant. Determining the proper level of
generality is not a problem unique to balancing but is intensified by it precisely because balancing is so closely tied
to adjudication and its tradition of concrete, narrow particularity. Twenty years ago Fried introduced this connection into the literature of balancing by spelling out the obvious implication of the traditional dichotomy: courts are
most legal when they balance at concrete levels and most
political when they answer general or abstract questions.
The point might be well taken but it lacked the power to
shape an approach that is exquisitely labile, for balancing
was readily employed in determining its own locus of operation: adjudication would be situted between the ad hoc and
the abstract, between resolving particular disputes and
making general legal statements by balancing competing
considerations. That is, no 'method' external to balancing
was capable of specifying its theater of proper functioning, but failure to be conscious of this lack contributed to
the flight of legal discourse from the social substance of
its cases in favor of a consuming self analysis. Modem
lawyers, like modem artists, lost interest in the world.
By far the most transparent weakness of balancing is
its assignment of weights to the litany of considerations
it identifies. The difficulty no doubt contributes to balancing competing considerations pegged at incommensurate
levels of abstraction: higher levels weigh more and that
simplifies an accounting otherwise relegated to the abyss
of a utilitarian mini/maxi calculation. Legal actors
reasonably comfortable with balancing as a mode of rationality in the first two operations will come unstuck here,
if at all, because weighing tends to expose the absolute
dependence of balancing on values. Economists suggest
that this difficulty be eliminated by the introduction of
market mechanisms: a resolution according to the
movements of power rather than as a function of relative
virtue - the preferred technique traditional lawyers exhibit
when they explicitly or implicity invoke 'shared values' to
valorize one or more of the competing considerations.
Weighing may expose the absolute salience of values,
but they are not absent from the identification of relevant
considerations or selection of the proper level of relative
abstraction. Since values construct or dilate perception and
perception elaborates, refines and distorts values, the
perception of a problem entails an identification of considerations and a selection of proper levels of abstraction
that is fully saturated with values. Were it the goal of balancSPRFNG
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ing to shelter law from the unjustifiable intrusion of subjectivity it must be condemned as a failure on this ground
alone. But liberalism is far too savvy to be caught out so
easily; it recognizes the obvious truth that there can be no
perfect escape, no secure sanctuary within which public
life can be assured an immunity from the contamination
of private values. Balancing is simply a way to minimize
the effects of this contagion loosed upon the world when
we achieved our freedom from totalized social life. The
study of balancing thus returns to an understanding of it
as a moment in the movement of Truth.
Inits second or third year the seminar worried over
distinction between balancing as a zero sum
game and balancing as the insertion of a third term or selection of a middle position. Where, for example, the question is whether the public schools may forbid students from
wearing politically motivated insignia during the normal
school day, the consequence of balancing is a judgment
that the schools may not do so. Or where the question is
whether a certain religious sect may be required to send
its children to some accredited school, the consequence
of balancing is that the state may not require this type of
conformity. On the other hand, in proscribing abortion the
state is neither free nor absolutely constrained, but its
power is distributed conditionally across the three trimesters
constituting the pregnancy term with virtually no power during the first and a reciprocal indulgence during the last;
similarly, the death penalty may not be either mandatory
or discretionary but must be imposed under the supervision of standards guiding the exercise of judgment in each
case. The examples are from constitutional law, but both
techniques are found everywhere legal judgments are made.
It is entirely possible that this distinction has no
significance for understanding balancing practice but is the
function of creative imagination. If we hypothesize a distinct
preference for middle positions whenever there is an intense
struggle between antagonistic forces demanding unqualified
victory, then judgments of the zero sum type are the consequence of an inability to specify a coherent middle position. Labor law, for example, is contained within a
discourse of labor-management struggle rather than a relation of labor and capital on the assumption that management 'represents' capital. Consequently, unionization
movements among managers present a serious difficulty
because management does not exist as a coherent independent third term between capital and labor, and to assimilate
management to labor would leave the latter in an
unmediated confrontation with the owners of the means
of production - without, that is, the mediation of a
'representative! management. The difficulty lies in an inability to disengage the dual nature of managers as workers
with no voice but their own, and managers as the articulate
presence of owners. Other comers of legal discourse have
greater freedom to distribute difficult judgments across what
is frequently an enormously broad space inserted between
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otherwise binary concepts. Of the traditional doctrinal

categories 'remedies' has proved to be one of the most
useful avenues of flight from difficult substantive judgments.
Remedies make possible an enormously liberal specification of rights without necessarily imposing upon defendants
particularly public agencies, public officials and
employers - the full burden of constraint otherwise entailed by plaintiffs taking rights seriously. Pleading requirements and the allocation of burdens of proof participate in this strategic deployment, perhaps more often
than one would like. Sentencing is the criminal analogue
of remedies generally in that sentencing judgments admit
a flexibility foreclosed to the determination of guilt by the
'rigidity' of substantive definitions: in principle, the element
of intention is deaf, dumb and blind to the difference between the most compassionate instance of euthanasia and
the local goon squad plying its trade for cash. Convictions
for lesser included offenses are frequently the functional
equivalent of a sentencing judgment; as such they present
the classic strategic dilemma of either constructing a binary
option for the trier of fact or opening the potential for difference splitting.
Among the more creative uses of the middle position
is its massive deployment in situations where rules were
regarded as unworkable and discretion as unthinkable or at least unacceptable. Much of legal regulation was thus
given over to the development of standards guiding and
channeling discretion, to use the popular locution. Legal
actors who regarded rules in the traditional sense as
cumbersome, expensive and inefficient expressed a marked
preference for standards administered by individuals
having some quality that could be classified as a modest
expertise - preferably a substantive one rather than the
legal sort to which judges pretend. On the legislative side,
the substantive quelling of New Deal fever had little effect
on the tendency to insert an agency administering standards between every need and its satisfaction. A barely
detectable murmur of dismay eventually grew into
something like a roar with the perception that public life
was caught between a pair of facing mirrors. The insertion
of standards between law and official power resulted in the
demand for rules regulating the regulators. Administration
was thus vaguely bounded on the one side by a law making function always threatening to exceed the delegative
power of its legislative superior, and on the other side by
a due process demand for judicial supervision of adjudicative judgments that threatened to bury the enterprise
beneath an elephantine legality. Futurists might try their
hand at predicting whether this tremendous middle space
populated by agencies and standards will eventually consume both law and politics in a nightmare of administration quite unlike the pacific version imagined by Marx, or
will merely shatter into minute and trivial binary
distributions.
With this general understanding of the nature and
distribution of middle positions, the seminar was in a posi22

tion to pose their relation to balancing. In principle, the
description of a judgment bears no necessary relation to
the procedure that produces it; on this ground balancing
becomes one possible mode of producing middle positions
that might otherwise be created intuitively, dogmatically or
as the vector of matched forces. The study of balancing
as a 'method' might well attempt to explain the conditions
under which it produces either a middle position or a zero
sum result. The earlier suggestion that zero sum judgments
result from an inability to develop coherent middle positions is very likely, but the evidence indicating this
preference cannot be readily gathered.
The relation of middle positions to balancing Is far
more interesting when the latter is studied against a
background of Truth with attention focused precisely on
the creation of middle positions by alternative modes. If
we assume for the moment that middle positions are preferred by a form of life that eschews extremism then it is
simple to generate a menu of relevant ordinary practices:
bargaining, compromise, splitting the difference, negotiation and 'third terms' that match no demands but are universally acceptable would all be included in this listing. But
none of these is quite the same as balancing posed as a
moment in the movement of Truth because they do not
involve an identifiable procedure and are not generally
defended as positive productions rather than unavoidable
necessities for securing peace. Balancing is much larger as
a practice the tendency of which extends well beyond the
production of middle positions. To the extent it is embedded in negativity, in resignation, the reference point Is not
the exhaustion or convenience of the parties but faith,
Truth, objectivity, totality. It is movement within immobility;
confidence within monumental uncertainty; fashion that
encloses the history of its finitude within an absolute
relativism. It's what we do now. Middle positions are relevant even though they have a genetic history that is not
the history of balancing as such because they are part of
a Truth upon which balancing depends.
Moderation is not a mid-point between two extremes
(as, for example, a rule of qualified immunity is a situs between absolute liability and absolute immunity), but is the
name of a state falling between excess and insufficiency.
To be sure, one could speak of qualified immunity as related
to an excess/insufficiency of liability, but moderation Is a
singular site of virtue rather than an alternative reflecting
certain policy preferences under stipulated conditions.
Moderation in this sense has a history of its own, but one
which is also a part of the history of modem history.
Huizinga characterized the Middle Ages as a period of
vascillating extremism rather than one valorizing moderation. There was no doubt a tendency, extending well
beyond the Middle Ages, for all forms of authority to appear as an unmediated presence, and this is hard soil in
which to plant the seeds of moderation. The 'timeless' common law of the early 17th century bears this same stamp,
As Pocock puts it: "Once men had appealed to the imINTHE PUBLIC INTEREST
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memorial, the laws must be either absolutely immemorial
or subject to an absolute sovereign - there seems to have
been no idea of a middle way" (Ancient Law, 52). Before
the century was out liberal thought had begun the task of
locating human experience in a finitude that simultaneously
introduced a fissure eliminating participation in a
transcendence connecting social life with creation, nature
and Truth, while opening up the possibility that man precisely because of his finitude - could come to know
everything. Man became a subject who could, by posing
himself as an object, come to know his own history other
than as an endless unfolding of the same - as something
different from a perpetual present. The conception of
history as a movement of continuity and rupture made
possible the introduction of changes that preserved identities but were, nevertheless, not a simple perpetuation.
Eventually, history as a practice reduced to a discipline
would see itself reflected in its subject matter and produce
endless exercises in moderation - often termed 'balanced
accounts'. But the full significance of finitude did not appear during theearly years of our seminar, so a richer detailing of its significance should be postponed.
Though it has a dramatic bearing on late 17th and early 18th century developments, it would be misleading to
suggest that the elaboration of moderation was of a piece
with secularization. Seventeenth century Puritans expected
moderation to save religion from the twin dangers of
passive indifference and enthusiastic inspiration, and
moderation could even serve to bridge that terrifying gap
between spiritual and material life in the mediating forms
of thrift, diligence, sobriety and frugality (Tawney, 110).
Complete absorption of the Weberian thesis, however, is
not essential to specifying the significance of moderation.
Thus Christopher Hill: "Fear of the vulgar, of the emotional,
of anything extreme, was deeply rooted in the social anxieties of Restoration England. Enthusiasm was associated
with lower class revolution: the propertied classes had
learned the dangers of carrying things to extremes, and
were leaming the virtues of compromise. Halifax saw God
Almighty as a trimmer too, 'divided between His to two
great attributes, His mercy and His justice" (Century of
Revolution 252-3).
We have grown accustomed to regarding economic
man, as he fully matured over the course of the 18th century and came to rest in utilitarian principles, as an
unrestrained maximizer of his subjective good. But there
is good reason to believe the pursuit of self interest, the
injunction that 'interest will not lie', carried a moral dimension confining aggressive acquisition within bounds of
moderation. The notion of interest itself was understood
as something of a midpoint between a cold and calculating
rationalism uninformed by desires and the full and
dangerous expression of unmediated passions. Eighteenth
century interests were desires 'guided and channeled' by
reason. The flexibility of modem balancing, its ability to
move from zero sum calculations to selecting points of acSPRING
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commodation, owes everything to this notion of interest
that enjoyed a dramatic elaboration from the late 17th to
the end of the 18th century. Liberal social practice, stretching from the psychiatric determination of illness reflected
in behavior which is plainly not in one's self-interest to the
democratic representation of interests, disperses interest
throughout its field and attributes to it a salience resembling that of gravity in Newtonian physics. The notion is difficult to manage because it floats about sometimes appearing as a specification of an objective good but otherwise
merely describing the shape and contours of particular subjective desire. The objective/subjective ambiguity of interest
is a contemporary phenomenon that was present at its birth
in the 17th century when interests were specifications of
objective statuses and functions: landed interests,
agricultural and manufacturing interests, foreign trade and
so forth. Eighteenth century political practice required that
each of these interests have a parliamentary voice which
'virtually' represented the interest as such and made unnecessary a multiplication of representatives adding nothing
to rational deliberation. The burden of much American
revolutionary rhetoric was concerned with establishing a
divergence of interest between the colonies and the supposed virtual representation of those interests in Parliament;
the insistence on forms of actual rather than virtual
representation amounted to a fracturing or disintegration
of the established interest classifications. Virtual representation attributed interests to persons, groups and communities independent of subjective determinations which
would result in an endless proliferation of inherently incommensurable interests. Madison plainly recognized this implication of the revolutionary demand for actual representation of infinitely variable subjective interests the domination of which would undermine national coherence and unity; Madisonian federalism set out to transmogrify this babble of particularity into the National Interest.
The balancing seminar learned about the politics of
interests from its sister seminar in 'Representing which was
created to study the diachronic and synchronic movements
of representation. Within a year or so the distinction between the two seminars was nominal at best. In part this
was due to the appearance in contemporary legal literature
of new research locating the objective/subjective movement
of interest at the center of the lawyer-client relation and
the formation of class actions in civil litigation - to cite
two prominent instances. Lawyers tend to studiously ignore or be otherwise ignorant of the subjective, idiosyncratic and particular quality of client interests in favor of
an objectivization that renders them coherent for the lawyer
and manageable within the doctrinal syntax and institutional constraints both will encounter. Thus a client is
assumed to be interested in acquittal and the minimization
of sentence rather than the vindication of innocence, the
embarrassment of a complaining witness or the sacrifice
of her own welfare for the benefit of others. Though professional representation conceives of client interests as
23

radically subjective in principle, in practice client interests
are distributed within a fairly narrow classification exhausting possible recognitions. Similarly, class actions are
unproblematic to the extent plaintiffs articulate class
demands that specify commonly shared interests like financial recovery since it is assumed that maximization of gain
is an interest everyone shares. The specification of an interest in, for example, desegregated schools or the elimination of police brutality immediately raises the possibility of
diversity among putative class members and thus endangers class certification.
The seminar focused on two points of relevance this
research did not itself articulate. First, the objective/subjective ambiguity in these contemporary contexts are rather
precise reflections of 18th century practice dividing the virtual representation of objective interests and the actual
representation of subjective interests. (The similarity is
rough to the extent there never was an actual representation of subjective interests.) Where, for example, the client
is absolutely confined within the objective interest of acquittal or gain, her particular identity is quite immaterial,
save as it bears on tactical considerations. Hence clients
who insist upon pursuing truly subjective interests invariably
pose ethical problems for the professional. Second, the attribution of objective interests on the pretense that they
originated in an articulate subjectivity and the concomitant
suppression of truly subjective interests lies at the heart
of modem balancing practice. Balancing is not a matter
of identifying and classifying considerations but of
generating and weighing a set of relevant interests.
I !hterest marks the juncture, the common point of
referenced, the locus of similitude shared by balancing as
a zero-sum distribution and balancing as the creation or
energizing of a middle position. As a matter of historical
reference the notion of self interest was the largely secular
and particularly mercantile expression of moderation as the
situs of virtue. Within this expression, and surrounding and
impinging upon it at multiple points, was the quasiindependent distinction between interests objectively determined by political power relations (more commonly
understood as social practices) and interests extruded by
the subjective passions of individuals. At the middle all interests may be served though none are completely satisfied.
More importantly, the middle position continues to carry
a certain moral force as the perceived locus of communion
in the forms of compromise, accommodation, conciliation,
mutual recognition of (legitimate) differences, buying peace
at the price of frustrated desire or, most profoundly, the
impossibility of a social determination of Truth. This middle, this balanced position, is barely distinguishable from
an 'on balance! valorizing of one antagonistic demand over
another. Nevertheless, balancing in its binary mode has a
more rationalist tone no doubt attributable to the rhetoric
of weighing, calculating and evaluating interests that resist
resolution in the beatific space that passifies otherwise irreconcilable division.
24
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It is impossible to imagine a viable society truly

I respecting the great Hegelian division between

a civil society marked by an absolute subjectivity of interests
and a political society in which the state encloses as its
essence an irreducible general interest. At least since the
end of the 18th century two great mediating strategies were
dispersed throughout liberal society to carry the twin burden
of preventing collapse into a chaos of subjectivity and
undermining the tyrannical tendency of a unified and
general interest. First, the elaboration of relatively objective interests and their distribution into weakly bounded
and overlapping categories that would nevertheless function to organize diversity. Second, the penetration of
representational relations to the deepest levels of social life
in order to resemble and reassemble diversity throughout
the structures of family, neighborhood, city, workplace,
bureaucracy, political party, protest group, region and so
forth. Subjective interests must find their expression in the
objective forms of father, worker, woman, farmer,
southerner, unemployed, disabled, or investor in order to
be represented - to be made a living presence capable of
speaking in some other place at some special time when
the interest might be heard and respected or ignored and
denied. Representation - that mercurial notion breathing
life into liberal political society - owes nothing to the extensions and contractions of suffrage but owes everything
to the double functioning of objectified interests. Fundamentally, interests in the objective sense are mid-points
between diversity and unity: they reduce subjectivity to a
finite listing, an assignment of traits, strengths, biases and
passions. Representation is grounded in this transformation of an absolutely subjective civil society into a series
of determined and specified relations. This function of objectified interests might be called, with some plausibility,
communicating from civil society to political society. But
there is also a reverse flow, a movement that shapes and
conditions, that articulates upon diverse interests a specific
organization and a certain manner of speaking if it expects
to be heard. Because it is an exclusive voice, because it
holds a monopoly of political power, representation exerts
an immediate pressure on civil society that forces It to extrude only legitimate interests. What come to be understood
as interests, recognized interests, or legitimate interests are
the consequence of this double movement according to
which objectified interests may be represented and
representation requires objective interests.
This excursion into the interpenetration and mutual
dependence of representation and interest proved fruitful.
There could be no question that balancing practice depended heavily upon the identification of interests by someone
in some relevant context. Representing client interests was
surely one such context, but there was also the investigation of legislative history to lay bare statutory meaning by
inference from an intention or purpose to protect or suppress certain interests. The specification of interests was
invariably required by arguments addressed to the vindicaINTHE PUBUC INTEREST

tion of constitutional rights; explications, attacks and
defenses of controversial matters such as the exclusionary
rule, the habeas corpus jurisdiction rule or the void-forvagueness doctrine were organized around a frequently
creative detailing of the interests served and/or undermined by expansion or contraction of application. And
virtually all modem contract law teachers, having supped
at the table of legal realism, point out to their students that
the interest of contracting parties is in performance not a
lawsuit. Even garden variety legal literature places interest
identification and analysis at the center of balancing practice, as in Gunther's 1973 article praising the skill of Justice
Powell as a balancer. Representation seemed critical
because of the suspicion that interests were being invented
by lawyers and judges to suit the occasion.
Precisely because the truth of specified interests could
not be found in the purity of an empiricist fantasy, precisely because a relevant interest could not be identified by interrogating the desire of an individual subject or even an
implicated group, the question of an originating source
responsible for speaking in the name of objectified interests
could not be avoided. Even if it were the client who originally represented an interest to the lawyer, plainly the organization, formulation and presentation of a legitimate interest
depended upon the lawyer to represent it as a reality.
Nothing required judicial acceptance of such representations, of course, so additional or modified versions of
presented interests could easily become central to the
balancing operation. Suppose a worker who lost his pension because the company terminated his plan a few
months before benefits would have vested in him complains
of insufficient disclosure under assertedly applicable regulations of the Securities Exchange Commission, a complaint
that requires characterizing the pension as an investment
security. Nothing prevents a judge from 'finding' that
employees work for wages and are not investors with a
security interest. This judgment may certainly be read as
an observation about workers' attitude toward labor and
its alleged rewards that necessarily rejects the security interest argument as a piece of creative lawyering calculated
to give the client a shot at winning an otherwise hopeless
lawsuit.
Studying the movement of interests in balancing practice was gloomy and depressing business when following
the path neither deepened nor enlightened but merely lead
back into hoary issues of positive jurisprudence - the lawfact distinction counted among such debris. Where, for example, a defendant claims that the evidence against him
was unconstitutionally seized from premises owned, occupied or otherwise controlled by another person, the judge
may reply that he has no legitimate interest in securing or
protecting the privacy of another. This may be read as a
statement about the empirical existence of a legitimate, objectified interest (noting, of course, that the expectations
or desires of this particular defendant are immaterial); it
may be read as a determination of substantive Fourth
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Amendment law; it may specify a procedural mechanics
reflecting institutional considerations and have no bearing
on social interests or the law of search and seizure. Such
instances suggest that expecting interest recognition and
analysis to provide legality with an incremental rationality
is rather foolish.
Depressing though it might be, following the movement
of interest analysis back into the law-fact dichotomy locates
it within a traditional discourse and thus clothes it with a
dubious legitimacy - dubious, that is, relative to alternative
explications with a more radical tendency to undermine
confidence in the rule of law. Objectified interests may be
little more than subjective values packaged to permit their
attribution to actual people under specified circumstances,
or universalized and attributed to the state. Thus an interest in health and life may be attributed to the state when
it opposes an abortion rights claim but not when it would
support the receipt of payments by welfare claimants or
secure decent treatment to prisoners. A judge's values may
require maintaining the distinction between labor and
capital by rejecting any suggestion that capital is little more
than stored labor. This value preference will appear in his
opinion as an interest in income from wages attributed to
workers generally and not as the subjective desire of this
worker or group of workers. On the other hand, any suggestion that a judge who is himself an active investor should
be disqualified for conflict of interest would be rejected
unless he was interested in this particular corporate litigant.
The structure of adversity augments the suspicion that
interest analysis is a disengenuous vehicle for the introduction of values. Naive students may suppose that the injunction to take account of all relevant interests requires
specification of those supporting the opposing claim as well
as those cutting against it. In the previously mentioned
search and seizure case, for example, a compelling interest
in the protection of civil liberties might plausably be attributed to the state since the latter is primarily responsible for supervising the behavior of its agents. Combining
this interest with that of the defendant claiming the evidence
illegally seized is being used against him might well produce a balanced decision in his favor. But the premise of
adversity appears to entail a truncated range of interest
identification unless the interests can be normally
distributed among adverse parties. The legal literature surrounding the exclusionary rule is largely chaotic due to its
inability to specify or justify the distribution of interests
among possible representatives. If the defendant has a
weak interest in deterring illegal enforcement activity, particularly in habeas corpus, the state may have a powerful
if not compelling one. But the general assumption seems
to be that the interest in deterrence rises and falls with
defendant's stature as a representative of it; the possibility
of selecting another representative for this interest is not
considered a viable option within the context.
Following the movement of interest identification and
analysis with these few examples yields a number of fairly
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basic propositions: interest analysis may simply reintroduce
an unenlightened revision of the law-fact problematic into
contemporary legal discourse; it may also provide an excellent vehicle for the injection of otherwise illegitimate subjective value preferences disguised as attributed objectified
interests; the impact or relevance of an interest may be a
function of the representative selected to articulate and defend it; judgments respecting the representation of interests
are not merely passive reflectors of an already determined
social truth but contribute to the development and shaping of concrete social relations. Putting this last point in
other terms, given the legal statements described above,
what must workers do to have savings understood as investments in their future security; what must citizens do
to create an interest in precluding the illegal invasion of
premises not personally owned or occupied? To the precise
extent nothing can be done within concrete social relations
to create, modify or destroy interests, they must be
understood as merely the phantasms of a warped and
dissembling professional 'methodology'.
Perhaps the current situation is a degeneration.
e Perhaps there was a time when interests named
actual social relations. Ifs a difficult question whether the
collective interests of the 18th century, so apparent to
Burke in his famous speech to the Electors of Bristol at
the close of that century (and, it should be said, more than
a little anachronistic to the extent interests had by that time
come to enclose far more subjective desires), reflected the
social consciousness of those who supposedly held them
or were merely external conceptions imposed on the ruled
by the rulers. Agriculture, manufacture and mercantile interests have survived the centuries but for many purposes
are too gross, as they lack a requisite precision and particularity to serve under conditions of extended suffrage and
the manifold fragmentation of political voice. These developments do not, of course, resolve this difficult question
of social history and the seminar did not pursue it with a
disciplinary rigor sufficient to earn the respect of contemporary historians. However, the question has been re-posed
in a 20th century form somewhat narrower and more directly linked to the concerns of jurisprudence. The occasion
was Duncan Kennedy's suggestion to the seminar that post
World War HIbalancing was a more or less direct descendant of Pound's turn of the century sociological jurisprudence. Together with Brandeis' factual presentations
and the concern of the realist movement to enclose social
practices within a scientific assemblage supporting a reformist orientation, the hypothesis traced the ancestry of contemporary interest balancing back through a half century
of legal scholarship devoted to connecting the conceptual
with the real.
The 20th century hypothesis differs from the 18th century problematic to the extent the former involves a commitment to interrogate social life in the truth of its practice
and not simply iterate a social wisdom that assumes the
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transparency of desire and need. The difference, put
another way, lies in the 20th century insertion of science
between the conception of an interest and the practices
it allegedly captures. With interests firmly grounded in the
bedrock of hard data, balancing would be free to display
itself as a movement of reason brought to bear on the factual multiplicity inevitably extruded by a pluralist society.
Played out in this way the hypothesis provided a rather
neat account of a jurisprudential thread connecting 1910
to 1960, and it left plenty of room for a two-fold critique
castigating contemporary practice for both the degeneracy
of its commitment to facticity and the flabbiness of its
reasoning - the former at the hands of sociology and
psychology, the latter by economics and analytic philosophy.
These conversations uncovered a history of balancing as a relatively continuous development out of an 18th
century empiricist-rationalist dualism that unfolded across
two centuries of increasingly rationalized empirical investigation and progressively socialized or self conscious
logic. As the universe of behavior, action and event came
to be enclosed by orthodox methodologies outside of which
all was ignorance, superstition and hunch, so the rigor of
reason was loosened by situating it as a social practice informed and determined by a set of linguistic conventions
accepted by relevant practitioners. The meaning of facts
was given in the logic of a constitutive methodology; the
meaning of reason was given in the facticity of its constitutive practice. Dualism refused to vanish - though empiricism was helpless without mechanisms of reason that
were independent of it, and reason had no grounding other
than in the sociology of its practitioners. Modern thought,
which perpetually exhibited this diffuse blending and
reciprocity, was nevertheless committed to the inherent
severance of thought and event. A history of balancing,
if it were to do more than trace a course across successive
waves of liberal thought and the emergence of social
science, would need to take very seriously its own heuristic
principle according to which balancing was situated against
a background of Truth. In this temper it would not be sufficient to conclude that balancing was one of the forms
resignation takes when authority is severed from virtue, nor
would it be sufficient to undermine the smug pragmatism
of balancing practice by laying bare the inevitable contradiction of a practice that locates its Truth in negativity,
absence and lack - as though power could be justified by
genetic stupidity. Rather, balancing would need to be
understood as a technique engaged in the positive production of knowledge; that is, the hypothesis would pose
balancing not as itself a mode of Truth but as a producer
of Truth.* From this perspective it would be a mistake to
conclude that the interdependence of method and data,
thought and event, upon which modem social science rests
fails to solve its underlying dualism, for its task is precisely
The intermittent use of an upper case T is advised.
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to produce the truth of man's situation in the world. Balancing is a moment in this movement of Truth.
The modem obsession with epistemology is less
* interesting than those procedures purporting to capture, tame and pacify it. A philosophical practice, for
example, that consigns such concerns to its respectable but
nevertheless long buried ancestry, engages in its stead the
language within which questions are posed and propositions formulated in order to trim its fat, sharpen its precision and elaborate its analytic rigor. This flight from confrontation with the possibility of knowledge produces, along
its empiricist frontier, a recording and systematization of
what is in fact said, and on its rationalist flank, a logic of
statements. Our conversations attempted to get at this
amazing phenomenon: how was it that the modem social
disciplines, all founded upon a terrifying epistemological insecurity, could produce vast inventories of knowledge?
From clinical medicine to population genetics, from analytic
psychotherapy to the treatment of mass hysteria, in principle everything could be known. For the modem human
sciences mystery was neither intransigence nor
transcendence, but a synonym for tomorrow: a challenge
and a puzzle. Somewhere between 1642 and 1789 western
man may have lost his sense of organic connection with
a divinely inspired universe that ameliorated the pain of his
finitude with a guarantee of participation in a glorious infinity, but in return for this noncompensable loss he acquired the possibility of infinite knowledge. The interrogation of mystery was no longer tainted with blasphemy. The
reward for modem man's reduction to an absolute finitude
was to enter a history he would himself produce in order
to heal his ruptured continuity. Though apparently confined within an imprisoning finitude, man was finally free. 'For
man,' as Marx said, 'the root is man.' He could study nature
as he studied history: from the outside. And he could forget,
save at certain depressing and rare moments, that his
knowledge was entirely of his own creation and must suffer the ambiguity generally associated with an outsider's
perspective: objectivity undermined by distance. But even
here there was remedy in freedom: modem man could pose
himself as an object of knowledge and develop a catalogue
of mechanisms that tended to distort his understanding:
flawed perceptions, opacities introduced by mythologies,
contaminations produced by self interest and the tremors
of desire. Ultimately, the study of man might specify the
extent to which his own history determines the writing of
his history, the organization of his present, and the envisioning of his future.
Whether there is in all of this a core contradiction
depends upon alternative attitudes toward religion. Conceived as myth, obfuscation and opiate, religion is the reign
of darkness shattered by the enlightenment and its mancentered legacy which opened up finitude to the possibility of an infinite knowledge. But, on the other hand, as an
order of meaning, as a cosmic accounting supplementing
V
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the fragmentation of ordinary lives with a coherence independent of past and future, as a distribution of capacities
the prime virtue of which was to establish an absolute
horizon of intelligibility, the loss of religion was the loss
of Truth which endowed to us an incorrigible
epistemological puzzle. On this view there is surely contradiction within a consciousness that opposes the world
with an immobilizing uncertainty while postulating an
unlimited capacity to know its truth. The seminar, however,
was less concerned with the contradiction as such than with
locating balancing within a general functioning of
knowledge production that came to be organized over the
course of the 19th century as the human sciences. Everything modem man knows about himself is spread across
this terrain operating, at least in the 20th century, as the
official repository of all plausably valid statements. This
new man centered universe was distributed among the
various disciplines - medicine, economics, psychiatry,
sociology, history - within which communion rites and
liturgical forms were enforced with an exemplary severity.
If the seminar was to take seriously the notion of balancing as a moment in the movement of Truth it had to find
a language within which the human sciences could be
problematized.
The individual - the absolute subject driven by desire
and blessed from time to time with a civilizing and socializing reason - is the singular figure haunting our contemporary conception of liberalism's emergence from the muck
of feudal heirarchy within which place was far more significant than its occupant. Eventually individualism would be
recognized as ideology: an untruth exercising a very real
power in the contemporary world and having, at its moment of inception, a genetic and creative force. But there
is reason to doubt the individual was ever so vast a
character, for from the moment of his invention the purity
of his subjectivity was undermined by two sets of overlapping and cross-cutting relations. First, he was a subject
perpetually engaged in posing himself as an object - to
be studied, understood, deterred, cured, reformed,
stimulated, passified, regimented and educated. Second,
this absolute subjectivity was constantly situated in relation to a concern with populations. Whether it be in a
theory of value according to which the labor of a worker
is a unit in the production of national wealth, a market
theory assimilating the pursuit of self interest to the vigor
of a generalized economy of exchange, a codification of
criminal punishments according to a calculus of pains and
pleasures that assured public safety by manipulating subjective desire, or the production of a healthy population
through an intensive concern with treating hysterical
mothers, degenerate fathers and onanistic children (History
of Sexuality, 105). Throughout the practices that slowly
formed into disciplines man was a central but thoroughly
ambiguous figure: at once a transcendental subject whose
unlimited possibilities were guaranteed by his finitude, and
an empirical object to be watched, interrogated, and treated
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in order to produce the knowledge that would be applied
to him as voter, patient and delinquent. Contemporary
observers recognize the individual caught in this double set
of relations in the particularity, and often peculiarity, of the
Rorschach, the LSAT and the I.Q. - techniques that provide the individual subject with a knowledge of himself as
such, a knowledge produced, however, by examining individual objects re-constituted as populations. But these
particular instances are not to be understood as the extrusions of a science otherwise securely grounded for having
penetrated the superficialities in terms of which every subject knows himself to uncover energies, forces and
dynamics once confined within dim regions beyond his consciousness. Rather, these familiar instances merely reflect
techniques which found and constitute the human sciences
in general as a discourse in which the subject finds a truth
that he produced but which can never be his.
Why never his? Suppose the hardest case. The computer age has universalized a phenomenon born in late 18th
century carceral institutions: the preparation and elaboration of a dossier detailing observations made by ministering and administering personnel of the spontaneous and
responsive behaviors of lunatics, prisoners and eventually
clinical patients, public school students and soldiers. With
just medical, police, military and employment files considered, the subject was readily enclosed within a discourse
of achievement, deviance and vulnerability capable of
simultaneously specifying his individuality and constructing
out of so many individualities a general distribution for extensive populations. If it would ever be possible for the
human sciences to present a subject with his truth the richly
textured and multiplied dossier exhausted that potential to
the extent it was a more or less meticulous recording, not
merely of random or indifferent events, but of responses
to calculated stimuli and observations of behavior under
controlled and thoroughly mapped conditions. But the
truth of the dossier was wholly a function of its capacity
to render the subject in terms of a universal currency that
located him in a movement of similarity and difference
within a patterned distribution of populations. The dossier
could speak to the subject only in terms of his relative approximation to a core clustering; in terms, that is, of a norm
and its deviation. Unless reduced to this common currency
of norm-deviation the mass of details cluttering and encourging the dossier were so many meaningless and trivial
inscriptions. The truth of the subject could be given only
in this currency of the normal and its approximation. And
with an irony largely lost on the mass of examiners, the
subject enjoyed a true individuality only insofar as he stood
outside the norm, removed from it and resistant to its
voracity. The subject was truly an individual, that is, to the
extent he was bad, mad or childish (Discipline and Punish,
193). The truth of the dossier was never confined to the
subject but reflected a certain strategy for the containment
of populations. The truth of the subject was always the
same: to the extent he was normal he was lost in a
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massification produced by his own participation in the
techniques designed to observe and examine him; to the
extent his deviance specified an individuality he was a candidate for regulatory interventions calculated to reduce it
to the norm that gave it life.
The eruption of the human sciences in the early 19th
century requires this complex story, but one that is essential to place balancing practice in relation to its surface and
subterranean dependencies. The 20th century hypothesis
according to which balancing was articulated upon a renewed calculation of social interests accumulated, constructed and observed by a relatively mature and fully
legitimate social science requires an appreciation of its relation to that science at a discursive level that predates and
plainly anticipates its appearance as a dogmatic locution.
The following elements open up the possibility of response
to the question: what made possible the easy insertion of
interest balancing within 20th century legal discourse?
1. Nothing was ever more familiar and traditional than
the necessity to somehow reconcile a mode of reasoning
to an assimilation of facts. Whether fashion demanded
moral idealism, instrumentalism, conceptualism or the
distillations of experience, legal discourse was caught within
the demand for a synthesis that might escape perpetual
criticism battering it with charges of excess and deficiency
on one side or the other. In this sense balancing had been
an immanent presence since the end of the 18th century:
dualism ultimately conquered by resignation to the inevitability of its trap.
2. The dilemma was repeated, and deepened, in the
treatment of the subject as at once an absolute individual
overflowing the contingencies of time, place and relation,
but also a mere difference shrunk to the size of a particle
within an enormous population. The discourse of rights
posed this new figure of the transcendental subject against
a population which, in the name of democracy, reasserted
a sovereignty the 18th century inherited from tyrants and
despots. The Rights of Man required that one forsake the
world in pursuit of an idea lest democracy destroy the idea
that grounded its revoluntionary energy. Between the twin
terrors of license and tyranny, anarchy and despotism,
social salvation required the insertion of a political moderation borrowed from an ancestry of protestant virtue.
3. Individualism was an idea finding its expression in
empirical subjects whose needs and passions could easily
be distorted, affected by disease, engaged in degenerate
expressions and assume otherwise dangerous tendencies.
There was never a suggestion that justice was obliged to
enclose deviance within a mindless discourse of similarity.
Hence the empirical subject, as contract suitor, injured
employee, divorce petitioner or disappointed legatee, had
to articulate her desire within conceptions of business practice, familial virtue and behavioral tolerance. The point is
not merely that these conceptions were distorted by class
relations, but that through most of the 19th century the
empirical subject, the actual individual, was invisible as a
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subject to the extent she did not fit moral or conceptual
expectations. In this 19th century world of infantile
psychiatry, economics, medicine and political science, hope
for a struggling capitalist democracy had to be placed on
fully objectified interests enclosed within centers of power
poised in mutual opposition. With the truth of the subject
given categorically, attention could be devoted entirely to
distributions and arrangements according to a logic of class
and member. But the transcendental subject continued to
haunt the enterprise as the bearer of a will fully determining the meaning of contract, or as the seller of goods to
buyers of her own choosing, or as the owner of property
asserting an irreducible pleasure in its employment.
4. What remained for the 20th century was the
discovery of a technique for engrafting reason, moderation
and conceptualism onto the body of the empirical subject;
a mechanism, that is, which recognized reason itself as a
mutual accommodation of the conceptual and the empirical; which had already introduced within its own
movements a moderation of the stress anarchy worked
upon populations; which had raised to language a more
or less translatable conception of the subject. What
remained, that is, was for the 20th century to discover in
the human sciences a dramatic capacity to specify
regularities of character, behavior and desire in terms of
normality and deviation. Health, adjustment, conformity,
growth and reform were but some of the terms locating
what could be known about man as so many centers of
normality and systems of regular functioning, as stipulations of excess and examples of underdevelopment, as
diagnoses requiring intervention to re-establish equilibrium
or retard disruption.
The easy insertion of interest balancing within modem
legal discourse was possible because it was already present within the terms required for its exercise. Insofar as
it counted as a mode of reasoning, balancing already moved
within the mood of resignation that hopelessly strived to
accommodate the unbridgeable gap severing fact and concept, mind and world. And it was already present in a
solidified if not calcified political discourse celebrating the
success of an experiment with democracy that avoided for
almost two centuries the twin spectres of a degenerate licentiousness and a tyrannical oligarchy. And it had already
found a home within the conceptual deployments of relative
rights, police power, reasonable expectations and alas, unconscionability. Finally, when it came to identify the interests worthy of being taken into account - be they ones
of security or privacy, speech or silence, substantive notice
or formal regularity - they could be constituted in light
of the principle of regular functioning which, having
achieved total social saturation in the form of normativity,
would take their place within balancing practice as an
already conceptualized and balanced facticity. The
interests, that is, would not be the whims of an infinitely
variable subjective desire, but legitimate interests based on
reasonable expectations - interests reflecting a normal facSPRING
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tion within social difference, or which spoke of normal
desires and coherent ends. The final condition making
possible the easy assimilation of balancing practice within
a legal discourse having pretensions to rigor was not the
substantive accumulations of social science, nor the data
its methods could amass for particular purposes, but the
penetration of normativity as such.
Normativity is a complex notion, and balancing practice fully exploited this complexity. First, from countless
observations and examinations the human sciences distill
certain regularities around which circulate anomolies, deviations and mysteries as so many dependencies on the
sovereign norm. The conceptualizations, procedures and
mathematical conventions they employ are, of course,
never themselves empirical. It is in this sense that the norm
was already a 'balance' of fact and concept. Balancing practice modeled its notion of interest on the norm, and to this
extent contemporary interest balancing employs a notion
of interest that does not fit the 18th century 'objective'sublective' version. The interests that are balanced are normalized in the sense of being conceptualized, standardized, regularized and legitimized; they are already, that is,
a conceptualized treatment of a 'raw' facticity - a balance
of thought and perception. When articulated upon the
norm, balancing interests constitutes a compound balancing. Second, normativity never occupied a space of pure
description, never lived as a mode of being undisturbed by
the possibilities of becoming; it could never be indifferent
to the claim that perhaps things ought to be otherwise.
Within the disciplines that police the normativities of health,
adjustment, trade practices, institutional functioning or
political competence there is no doubt strong support for
the notion that the truth of the norm cannot be disturbed
without dramatically altering our orientation to ourselves
and the world. Certainly no substantive sanctity attaches
to any particular measure, theory, explanation of functional
accounting; science is always open to revision, rejection
and elaboration. But with respect to normativity itself there
can be no tampering without profoundly disrupting Western
man's self knowledge. Hence the ethical power of normativity as the first principle of coherence whose dark and sinister other is the chaos of pure difference. Consequently,
balancing practice has no obligation to much about in the
pit of desire for its interests but may, with complete ethical
support from its alliance with normativity, consider normalized interests as having a certain claim to virtue. If
memory serves, it was Justice White who once remarked
in the context of a libel case that there was no legitimate
interest in publishing lies. Finally, normativity has managed to present itself as the benign consequence of dedicated
and assiduous investigation by generations of scholars
stimulated by a passion to know the truth of man. Perhaps
the search is endless but it is not pointless so long as there
is a sense of progress: what is known later is known
better. The human sciences are largely sheltered from the
historian's nightmare of uncertainty whether a different
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rendering is a better one, whether the truth of an event may
be captured in 'thick description', whether one is ever doing more than discovering the prsent in an ever receeding
past. There are, to be sure, constant embarrassments: ordinary individuals behaving like barbarians under experimental conditions; psychiatrists feigning madness and
discovering that their sham is transparent only to the insane; I.Q. tests fluctuating wildly as a function of attention, affection and encouragement; the torture of clinical
medicine trapped between a general physiology and the
mysterious opacity of particular clients. It is unlikely that
embarrassments can seriously disturb these disciplines even
to the point of their recognizing that without the notion
of progress, of incremental addition and cumulation, there
is no basis for preferring, for example, modem psychiatry
to its 19th century alienist ancestor. Without the mystique of progress the human sciences might be unable to
avoid confronting the possibility that they produce a truth
of man in response to the demands of the moment sometimes the moment is quite long, as in the case of normativity, but otherwise quite short, as in the sociological
connection of poverty and deviance. In either event the image of the human sciences as engaged in positive productions rather than in discoveries of hidden and passive but
fully formed gems radically alters not merely the status of
the disciplines, but the security of man's grounding in his
knowledge of himself. This is the image of the human
sciences balancing practice grasped in its sophisticated
naivete: that the normalized interests it purported to
recognize were its positive productions and not the
discoveries of some arcane but reliable methodology.
Throughout the century the human sciences could be seen
as the producer of the normal family, the productive worker,
the careful driver, the stable market and, lest we forget,
healthy sexuality. Substantive legal doctrine had long
reflected this creative impulse with its absurd dispersion
of the reasonable man and its manifold calculations of ordinary risk. So the production of interests did not, in
general, enter boldly where no lawman had ever tread, nor
did it, in particular, produce bastard interests. The parentage of the interest in privacy could be established in a way
more or less satisfying to scholarship, but that it was wholly
produced as a general norm enclosing an amazing variety
of situational contingencies could hardly be denied. These
were the three complexities of normativity interest balancing exploited: the 'balance' of fact and concept already present within the norm, its ethical dimension, and its creation as a positive production of the human sciences.
Balancing practice as a discourse of normal interests
is directly connected with the historical figure of the
transcendental subject in relation to state and civil society.
English liberalism posed the individual as the great other
of collective power engaged in a struggle of mutual recognition and exclusion inevitably determined by the gap between singularity and multiplicity. Continental theory
located the transcendental subject within civil society
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understood as a mass of singular individuals incapable of
mutually penetrating the breastwork of self interest, of absolute difference, but conceived political society - the
Hegelian state - as the locus of synthesis above the divisions of particular interest and independent of them. Marx
accepted the division between civil and political society,
but denied the possibility of real synthesis in political citizenship to the extent the state was not a mediator but a tool
of certain particular interests. In both renditions the individual circulates within a private life which is particular
and self regarding but longs for a public one that is synthetic and collective. The truth of the empirical subject,
however, is not at all monadic but is given in terms of a
normativity that locates collectivity at the core of every subject. Within civil society the subject is individual only to
the extent he is deviant, and that is why he is a candidate
for correction and cure. The human infant gains weight at
an expected rate, begins to walk at about the right time,
develops the capacity for language appropriately, gets along
well with other children, is not too sullen or hyperkinetic,
and scores 105 on her second grade I.Q. test. No serious
political discourse may continue to ignore the collective
penetration of the empirical subject.
On the other hand, the image of political life given by
a discourse of representation suggests not a synthetic
general interest but the bargained resolution of conflicts
whose temporary suppression is merely a sign of their inevitable reappearance. Within what theaters of political
power, according to what strategies of assimilation might
the normativity of the empirical subject in civil society be
made present in political society? There are many
possibilities, but the normalized interests of balancing practice seem ideally suited to providing the semblance of a
mediation between civil and political society. It can be
only a semblance, of course, since the fundamental dualism
necessitating a mediation vanished with the normalization
of civil society. That is, to the extent the isolated and fully
private person populating the classical image of civil society
was reduced by the norm he was no longer the figure opposing state sovereignty with a limit that could mark its
transgression, that could humble it with the charge of excess. What appears before the tribunal of the state is not
the transcendental subject visiting from his home in monad
land to present her claim of personal right against a
sovereign transgression, but an empirical subject seeking

the protection of a normalized interest against the particular
political factions who managed to have their way with
statutory language, or deviant political officials falling to
respect thoroughly normal interests. Balancing practice thus
displays on its surface a virtually complete independence
from the classical discourse according to which state and
individual stood opposed as the figures of freedom and
necessity. Balancing practice requires no one to strike a
blow for freedom or accuse sovereignty of a loathsome
transgression. The claimant looses when the interest he
states represents an excess, an abnormality, a deviant verIN THE PUBUC INTEREST

sion of the normal interest or one that is not normal at all.
And the state need not be tyrannical to occasionally employ
deviant agents or be caught in the grip of a faction that
distorts balanced political programs. Since we know from
the vast productions of political science that in the course
of its regular functioning the state, much like a person, will
inevitably cause harm to some or disappoint others, it
follows that state deviance is a proper ascription only where
the harm was intentionally produced and not merely the
ordinary by-product of otherwise legitimate pursuits. The
great dyad of political adversity is gone; the transcendental subject bearing rights against an otherwise absolute
sovereignty has disappeared in favor of an empirical subject imbued with legitimate expectations complaining of
their frustration at the hands of deviant officials, the
domination of normal state functioning by a particular faction, or an intentional abuse of state power.
discussions of balancing in terms
V
hOf
normativity, so heavily influenced by our
reading of Foucault, did not occur until we had passed
through conversations locating it within a more ordinary
discourse of liberalism as a strategic escape from the antinomies of reason/theory and fact/perception. Balancing
could be understood as a classic Live Boundary: a space
populated by an irreducible admixture of reason, fact and
value, a suspension that could be defended precisely
because liberal epistemology regarded its elements as inherently Vacuum Bounded. Liberalism found no ground
to abandon its first principles in the impossibility of their
synthesis, but transformed this epistemological
dilemma into a positive argument for the virtue of accommodation, moderation and balance. The consequential middle position was incoherent in the sense all such Live Boundaries are: an unstructured composit whose elements freely
circulate independent of all necessities. The seminar could
easily comprehend Madison's theory of a Federal Congress
constructed to prevent the domination of any particular faction as a Live Boundary the inevitability of which derived
from loss of faith in an objective, universal reason. To be
sure, documents survive which participate in an 18th century political rhetoric comprehending parliaments as
deliberative bodies for the general good, and it is very tempting to read them as flatly contradicting the essential liberal
rejection of a universal good generated by the application
of reason to a wild multiplicity of subjective values. To avoid
contradiction Madison's congressional theory must be
distinguished from the classical English understanding of
parliament as a deliberative body and read as establishing
a locus of accommodation, a space wherein multiple points
of intransigence intersect, accumulate and lose intensity,
discover alternative paths to realization, and survive in
pockets of relative obscurity. Hegelians might prefer to
describe a state so constituted as a synthetic realization
of the diversity of civil society, and Marxists flatly condemn
it as the disguised domination of a particular interest, but
STheseminar
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liberals continue to take pride in having re- discovered virtue in the middle way - falling short of an impossible
transcendent totality yet still rising above narrow and selfish
particularity. Understood as a Live Boundary, the seminar
could treat balancing as solidly embedded in American
political institutions.
Below mere institutions, at the level where the appearance of sovereignty is made possible, conditioning its
being and manifesting it concretely, is the Live Boundary
of representation elaborated since the middle of the 17th
century: representation as a voice that is also a silence; a
presence that is also an absence; appearance of that which
is shadowed; the concretization of an abstraction that is
simultaneously an abstraction from the concrete; a difference that is empty unless it is the same, but immobilized unless it is different. Representation is not a consequence of democratic sovereignty but its other face and
the principle of its functioning. Representation bears the
same relation to democratic sovereignty as does gravity to
mass: a mechanism of circulation that explains nothing.
The modem theory of representation understands the
represented as present in virtue of its absence, as an inarticulate silence requiring the voice of representation. The
representative is a difference that must perpetually deny
itself in favor of an assimilation with the absent represented,
but which must also assert itself as difference in order to
represent at all. Representation as an actual presence of
the represented required that the representative be regarded as a transparency, a cipher, an astral body or hologram.
It was a conception possible only where the represented
was a sovereign singularity capable of speaking as such.
Democracy perforce abandoned representation as an actual presence of the represented in favor of a presence by
virtue of an absence. Since representatives spoke with a
singular voice for a multiplicity that was always silent they
were caught in an ambiguity that was inherent and irreducible: it could never be known whether the voice of the
representative was his own - hence empty, corrupt and
without authority, or that of the represented and thus
saturated with legitimate power. At least from the end of
the 18th century when most minor flirtations with actual
representation ceased, representation became the name of
a space between presence and absence, a simultaneity of
presence and absence that has mystified and stimulated
political science ever since. Modem representation resides
in a space between presence and absence wherein both
are suspended and freely circulate in complete indeterminacy. Balancing may be a flight from the antinomies of
liberal theory, but as such it is more recent than novel.
Balancing and representation together populate a middle
space containing most of the characters in the drama of
modem life, relying upon and energizing each other. They
are joined by one additional resident having sufficient points
of contact with both that seminar discussion could hardly
fail to dwell upon it: expertise.
Expertise is the specific generator and transmitter of
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normativity; as such it is implicated, as previously mentioned, both internally and externally in balancing practices.
But it is also a type of representation. As a clinical practice, expertise operates in a middle space between the
logical determinations of science and the random
movements of hunch, surmise and preference. Clinical practice thus resembles the exercise of an official discretion that
is neither rule bound, in the deductive sense, nor able to
move with the freedom enjoyed by an absolute sovereignty. It also resembles a balancing practice that traces its
movement between varieties of abstract reason and the appearance of brute facticities. These might be called the intrinsic or structural resemblances between expertise, public
power and balancing that permit them to circulate within
a common Live Boundary space. But the seminar was more
interested in external connections, in the relation of expertise to balancing given the dependence of the latter on normativity. Ordinary understanding has it that public power
calls upon expertise to fill the gaps of ignorance with an
arcane understanding, to supplement common sense or
provide a systematic or otherwise defensible basis for
resolving conflicts of subjective desire that resist the power
of ordinary reason. In these contexts expertise appears as
a visitor from civil society, as the reporter of a coherence
and systematicity independent of the shifting and temporary syntheses achieved within the movements of
political representation because they reflect the 'natural' and
unmediated functioning of populations. This is expertise
speaking of the incidence of prostitution, of minimal nutritional needs, of the deterrent effectiveness of execution,
of the capacities of small groups for rational deliberation,
of vocational disability, of the behavioral distortions introduced by drug consumption, of a deteriorating nuclear
family. Though it is surely recognized that expertise speaks
with many tongues, nevertheless it always refers for its
authority to masses and populations that have been
reduced to regularities of functioning, that have been
observed and calculated with sufficient precision to
distinguish the norm and its deviations. To the extent the
norm is the truth of civil society, expertise is the representative of its sovereignty - and it is a representation that
reflects precisely the ambiguities of political representation.
Put another way, the public representative is to
majoritarianism what the expert is to the norm.
But these are not the contexts in which expertise
dominates, where its power is felt at immediate points of
application within civil society itself, where it generates and
develops, through a barrage of interrogations, stimulations
and examinations, the norm it will eventually represent on
its visits to political society. Expertise dominates where it
examines the bodies of children, determines dietary programs for their lunch, imposes behavioral standards,
specifies intelligence and predicts performance potential,
incarcerates and liberates from institutions, organizes
populations to be made available for warfare, mathematics
instruction and law school, identifies interest groups and
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economies of scale. And where it dominates it does so
without resistance and virtually without possibility of escape
from its ostensibly benign hunger for more precise and
global accumulations that advise, inform and rationalize
social practices collected under that charming label - the
private sector. Nothing needs to be said about state licensing to make the point that political society is an absence
made present in civil society by expertise. No licensed
clinical practice discovered the relation between poverty and
deviance and penetrated the existing humiliations of ghetto life with the further specifications of familial disorganization, indifference and moral barbarism. Sociology managed
this task without official assistance, without badge or
certificate; the deep conviction that poverty causes crime
has survived for half a century as the centerpiece of its contribution to the knowledge of society, and has effectively
stimulated both reformist pacifications and repressive invasions. Expertise is the representative of political society
within civil society not as a function of legal sanction or
formal delegation, but as a consequence of its need to
know. In a sense it is a concession that representation alone
cannot provide political society with the truth of a world
from which it is inevitably estranged.
The seminar might justly be proud of its ability to
escape the naive view of representatives and experts as
passive conduits providing passage for the flows of norm
and consensus. When situated in their positivity as producers of that which they purport to discover, the cohabitation of expertise, representation and balancing within a vast
and vapid middle space became clearer, more powerful.
Balancing practice might be easily criticized for using the
notion of 'shared value! as an escape from the hopeless
task of weighing otherwise incommensurable interests until it was understood that, rhetoric notwithstanding, shared
values were being created by the practice that discovered
them. In the midst of an impossible diversity balancing produced the truth of shared values much as expertise produced the norm and representation produced consensus.
That balancing, representation and expertise jointly occupy a middle space between transcendental reason and
empirical facticity is inherently related to the claim that they
also produce what they purport to discover. It is, to be sure,
an ordinary understanding of liberal epistemology that
reason simply provides the human capacity to comprehend
a world whose existence is independent of human perception. On this view consensus, norm and shared values are
empirical propositions discovered by certain active investigations, but their truth is independent of the investigations as such. It is precisely this ordinary understanding
that critical scholarship has attempted to disturb by detailing the appearance of 'data within a discursive order that
creates it. Thus, for example, the connection between
poverty and deviance was shattered by the simple realization that it was founded upon arrest statistics which were
entirely a function of intense policing. Though crime rates
are extremely sensitive to the relative deployment of perINTHE PUBUC IN'EREST

sonnel, the activities and records of police agencies provide the only archival basis for making (true) statements
about deviance. Twentieth century sociology freely used
this data without realizing it was already distorted by police
deployment within poor neighborhoods. Its own myopia,
as well as police saturation, were made possible by the deep
penetration and broad dispersion of a discourse enclosing
poverty and deviance that was already a century in the making. What the Chicago school 'discovered' in the 1930's
and '40's was a discourse of fear that began in the late 18th
and early 19th centuries as a political fear of the 'rabble!,
aggravated after the civil war by the unpredictability of 'uncivilized' former slaves, elaborated at the end of the century - particularly during the juvenile justice reform movement - by the perception of Irish and Italian immigrants
as incapable of respecting democratic values, and rounded off by politically tainted labor unrest and the explosion
of urban concentrations in the early 20th century. What
had been, in short, over a century of bigotry, 'experience'
and 'common sense! became the truth of modem social
science. The point is not that poverty and deviance are
strangers, but that statements connecting them reflect a
discursive contingency that is independent of the truth value
of the statement.
The example from the sociology of deviance is a simple one calculated to penetrate skepticism. But the same
holds for pathology, madness and value: the transformation
of difference into deviance by relating it to a moment of
absolute repose, a dim quietude that emits no sound and
utters no complaint; an invisible sameness that provides
the grounding of the human sciences. "Disease reveals normal functions to us at the precise moment when it deprives
us of their exercise.. .. If health is life in the silence of the
organs, then, strictly speaking, there is no science of health.
Health is organic innocence. It must be lost, like all innocence, so that knowledge may be possible" (Canguilhem,
52). It is this sameness that is produced in the middle space
occupied by representation, expertise and balancing.
Perhaps the most apparent example involves recognition
of the state's legitimate interest in security. The phrase appears with such frequency, is placed so far beyond arguments and denials that only exceptions, qualifications and
narrowly circumscribed constraints are possible. But the
problem is more original, for the state as such can have
no independent and distinctive interests; it can only represent interests generated elsewhere and coagulated at the
intersection of complex strands of representation. To speak
of the state's interest is to employ a discourse of representation and consensus that allows such statements, that
conditions their possibility. Balancing practice necessarily
takes this as a given; it moves freely within a discourse of
consensus and norm, for its task is to articulate upon every
conceivable instance of conflict a statement specifying that
which is shared, reasonable and fair. No normal citizen
would insist upon selfish gain as against a state interest
that outweighs her own, and if she insists that her interest
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is more substantial she becomes idiosyncratic, peculiar and
deviant. And the reverse: a state insisting upon its interest
in security where the consequence is prior restraint of
speech must surely show the wolf at the door lest it appear merely petulant, humiliated and vengeful. The question of how these interests are to be weighed is the wrong
question, for the task of balancing practice is not to
establish the objectivity of its predicate but to produce
shared values. Like any clinical practice it circulates in the
space between a system of determinations and a universe
of contingencies, thus eliminating the possibility of verification by either prediction or repetition. Within this space the
practitioner lives at the edge of a freedom that is at once
absolute and non-existent. Where reason does not hold she
has recourse to a judgment informed by countless instances
that can never fully determine the next. But when judgment
is challenged as merely hunch, surmise, distortion and bias
she has recourse to the vast store of probabilities, logics,
rules and principles without which no judgment worthy of
the name would be possible. There is, in short, no point
in beating at balancing practice in an effort to make it either
confess the guilt of a charlatan or speak a truth that is
anterior to it and upon which it relies. It is far more important to confront the practice in its consequences, in its
positivity; to ask not how it decided this case but to follow
its statements as they circulate within legal discourse, as
they penetrate journalism, politics, work groups, the home,
the mind and, primarily, the body. Balancing practice, after
all, produced the truth of privacy - not as an interest but
as a shared value surrounding sexuality: as a technology
of devices and medicaments, as an ethics of procreation,
as an environmentalism of dispersion and confinement,
and, most recently, as the ultimate truth of perversion. All
of this production began, lest we forget, during a decade
that exploded with sexual incitements, displays and libertine enthusiasm. Is this not something that remains a
mystery?

NOTES
Section II
-

The discussion of 18th century interests owes much to Hirschman's

"The Passions and the Interests." Pitkin's treatment of the period is useful
though simplistic.
- Chapter 15 of Pocock's "Machievellian Moment" contains an excellent
account of Madisonian Federalism. Katz, "State Action and Actions
Against the State" contains a more complicated treatment of virtual and
actual representation.
- The examples of class actions and lawyer-client relations draws on
the research of Simon & Yeazell.
Section V
- For the 'analytic of finitude' see Chapter 9 of Foucault's "The Order
of Things" which includes his thesis of the transcendental-empirical subject.
- Foucault's history of normativity is developed, thus far, in "Discipline
and Punish", "The Birth of the Clinic", and "The History of Sexuality."
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Further analysis of its relation to legal doctrine may be found in Katz,
"Foucault for Lawyers."
- The issue of sovereignty and rights was opened by Foucault in his
"Two Lectures."
Section VI
- Credit for deconstructing the sociology of deviance belongs to
Matza, "Becoming Deviant."
- On clinical practice see Friedson's "Profession of Medicine", Ch. 8.
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